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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
AUTO LEASE COMPANY, a partner-
ship, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE 
CO., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8746 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a ruling of Stewart Hansen, 
Judge, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
Utah, granting to defendant, Central Mutual Insurance 
Company, summary judgment of dismissal of plaintiff's 
complaint. 
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Plaintiff, in his complaint, seeks to recover damages 
under a certain insurance policy issued by defendant to 
Appellant and The Bearing Service and Supply Company 
on a fleet of automobiles which were leased by The Bearing 
Service and Supply Company from appellant. The said 
policy was in force during all times mentioned herein. 
On the 31st day of January, 1956 the appellant acquired 
in Michigan a new 1956 Chevrolet Station Wagon which 
appellant contends was a replacement of one of the automo-
biles mentioned in the policy of insurance issued by defen-
dant. The 1956 Chevrolet Station Wagon was delivered to 
an agent of plaintiff who was to drive the automobile to 
Salt Lake City. On the morning of the second day of Feb-
ruary, 1956 the automobile was totally demolished in a 
wreck on U. S. Route 30, 16 miles west of Cheyenne, Wy-
oming. 
On the morning of the same day plaintiff notified de-
fendant of the acquisition of the automobile and subse-
quently made demand for payment of its loss to the in-
surance company. This demand was refused by the in-
surance company and plaintiff filed suit. 
Defendant-respondent subsequently filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment upon the ground that there was no 
genuine issue as to any material ~act and the defendant was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion was 
based upon the pleadings on file, the insurance policy re-
ferred to in plaintiff's Complaint and the deposition of 
C. R. Jacobs, a partner in the plaintiff company. The mo-
tion was granted by the court, Stewart M. Hansen, Judge, 
and plaintiff appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE RULING OF THE COURT WAS CON-
TRARY TO LAW AND HENCE THE COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MO-
TION AND IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
AUTOMOBILE DESCRIBED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WAS NOT COVERED UNDER 
THE INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED BY THE 
DEFENDANT AND DESCRIBED IN PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RULING OF THE COURT WAS CON-
TRARY TO LAW AND HENCE THE COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MO-
TION AND IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. 
Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that "* * * The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file * * * show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." However, it is well estab-
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lished law that summary judgment should be denied if there 
is an issue of fact. 
"The purpose of summary judgment laws is to 
grant relief against procedural tactics interposed 
for delay, and not to substitute a new method of trial 
where an issue of fact exists." 
Fisher vs. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., 55 R. I. 
175, 179 A. 702, 103 A. L. R. 1097. 
It is clear that there is an issue of fact in this matter as 
to whether or not the automobile which was wrecked was 
a replacement for one of the vehicles included in the fleet 
of automobiles furnished to Bearing Service & Supply 
Company. (See transcript of C. R. Jacobs, Page 6, et seq.) 
It may be observed that the deposition of C. R. Jacobs 
in no way establishes any fact except that the vehicle was 
to replace and was replacing one of the vehicles which was 
insured. It may also be observed that the insurance policy 
issued by respondent provided as follows: "* * * AU-
TOMATIC INSURANCE FOR NEWLY ACQUIRED AU-
TOMOBILES: if the insured who is the owner of the auto-
mobile, or his spouse if a resident of the same household, 
acquires ownership of another automobile and so notifies 
the company within thirty days following the date of its 
delivery, such insurance as is afforded by this policy ap-
plies also to such other automobile as of the date of such 
acquisition; (a) if it replaces an automobile described in 
this policy, or (b) if it is an additional automobile and if 
the company insures all automobiles owned by the insured 
and such spouse at such delivery date; provided when a 
limit of liability is expressed in the declarations as a stated 
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amount, such limit shall be replaced by the actual cash 
value." 
It is clear that the above portion of the insurance pol-
icy is purposed to give -coverage on newly acquired automo-
biles of persons who are already insured by the company 
-the fact in this case. 
"The purpose of automatic insurance is to give 
coverage to persons who are already insured with 
the company in question upon acquiring a new ve-
hicle. The coverage extends to the new acquisition 
when it replaces the sole automobile owned by the 
insured." 
Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 
7, Sec. 4293, see also Utilities Ins. Co. v. 
Wilson, 251 Pac. 2d 175. 
Appellant complied with all the provisions of the in-
surance policy when it acquired the car in question. There 
is no contention on the part of respondent that anything 
else was done. Appellant contends that according to law 
it could rely on the belief that the automobile was insured 
in accordance with the terms of the insurance policy. 
"The language of the policy is to be construed 
in accordance with the principle that 'the test is not 
what the insurer intended its words to mean but 
what a reasonable person in the position of the in-
sured would have understood them to mean.'" 
Watson v. Firemen's Insurance Company, 83 N. 
H. 200, 202, 140 A. 169. 
See also extensive annotation in 127 A. L. R. 
483, citing numerous cases. 
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In all the evidence presented to the lower court there 
was not one scintilla of evidence that the wrecked automo-
bile was not acquired to replace the automobile described 
in plaintiff's complaint and also described in the insurance 
policy. This is a matter of fact which should have been 
determined by a trial wherein competent evidence could 
have been produced. 
There is no contention on the part of respondent that 
if the automobile is a newly acquired vehicle which re-
places an insured automobile the insurance policy does 
not cover that vehicle. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
AUTOMOBILE DESCRIBED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WAS NOT COVERED UNDER 
THE INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED BY THE 
DEFENDANT AND DESCRIBED IN PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
Respondent relied on the deposition of C. R. Jacobs 
and the pleadings on file to prove that the automobile 
described in plaintiff's complaint was not covered under 
the insurance policy which was issued. 
Appellant alleged in the Complaint at paragraph 4 
"That on the 31st day of January, 1956 the plaintiff ac-
quired one new 1956 Cheprolet V-8 4 door Station Wagon, 
Motor #0011887, Serial #VB56S004649 which automobile 
was to replace item #4 on the fleet schedule Station Wagon 
Serial #VB55J003559 attached" to respondent's insurance 
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~: policy. Respondent answered with a general denial and 
ijt a further defense that the automobile did not replace any 
i. 
~. automobile by reason of the fact that the replaced automo-
~ bile was still in use. It is submitted that this point is 
~; irrelevant in view of the above quoted clause in the insur-
~ ance policy and, in addition, is contrary to law as stated 
in Dean v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 24 Cal. App. Supp. (2d) 
~ 762, 68 P. (2d) 1021. 
~ The decision of the lower court was clearly contrary 
to law. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the law and the facts of this case the decision 
of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALAN H. BISHOP & 
BLAINE L. OPENSHAW, 
Counsel for Appellant. 
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